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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Shaun Patrick Conley appeals, pro se, from the judgment entered upon the district
court’s orders denying his request for the appointment of counsel and summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court set forth the factual and procedural background of Conley’s
underlying criminal cases, as follows:
On September 10, 2012, the Pocatello Police Department
responded to a call in which an eight year old child reported that she had
been molested by her mother’s friend, Shaun Patrick Conley. On
December 4, 2012, Conley was charged with lewd conduct with a child
under sixteen in violation of Idaho Code § 18-1508 and being a persistent
violator, Idaho Code § 19-2514 in Bannock Count[y] Case No. CR-1219069-FE. On December 20, 2012, a preliminary hearing was held.
Based upon discovery of certain information in that case, Conley was
charged on January 22, 2013 with 14 counts of sexual exploitation of a
child in violation of Idaho Code § 18-1507(2)(a) and being a persistent
violator, Idaho Code § 19-2514, in Bannock County Case No. CR-131145-FE. The persistent violator charges were based on a 1993 conviction
of a similar crime in California.
On April 8, 2013 Conley entered into a plea agreement in both
cases in which he agreed to plead guilty to the lewd and lascivious charge
and three counts of the sexual exploitation of a child with the State
dismissing the persistent violator charges and eleven counts of sexual
exploitation. With the guilty plea being accepted by the Court, Conley
filed [sic] out a Guilty Plea Questionnaire. The Court sentenced Conley to
five years fixed and ten indeterminate on the 19069 case and five years
with five indeterminate in the 1145 case, both sentences to run concurrent.
Conley filed an appeal in both cases on August 28, 2013. The
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s sentence and filed a
remittitur on November 24, 2014. On September 12, 2013, Conley filed a
Rule 35 Motion requesting leniency of sentence which the Court denied on
February 24, 2013. Lastly, on July 7, 2014 Conley filed a Motion for leave
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to withdraw plea of guilty which the Court denied on September 5, 2014.
…
(R., pp.286-87.)
On November 17, 2015, Conley filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief,
alleging two ineffective assistance of counsel claims and a prosecutorial misconduct
claim, and seeking relief from the judgments in both of his underlying criminal cases. 1
(R., pp.17-24; see also R., pp.35-171 (sworn affidavit and attachments).) He also filed a
motion for the appointment of post-conviction counsel.

(R., pp.13-16.)

The state

answered Conley’s petition, objected to his motion for the appointment of counsel, and
moved for summary dismissal. (R., pp.177-97.) After Conley responded to the state’s
filings (see R., pp.210-16, 226-72), the district court entered an order denying Conley’s
request for court appointed counsel, finding Conley’s post-conviction petition did “not
allege facts sufficient to raise a possibility of a valid claim” (R., pp.276-78). The court
also entered an order granting the state’s motion for summary dismissal, finding that
Conley’s two ineffective assistance of counsel claims were “wholly unsupported by facts”
and that his prosecutorial misconduct claim had already been raised and decided in the
underlying criminal case and was also disproved by the record. (R., pp.286-93.)
The court entered a final judgment (R., pp.313-14), from which Conley timely
appealed (R., pp.294-97, 318-21). Conley also filed a motion for the appointment of
appellate counsel (R., pp.304-07), which the district court denied (R., pp.310-12).

1

The state questions the propriety of filing a single post-conviction petition to seek relief
from the judgments entered in two separate criminal cases. See I.C. §§ 19-4901,
-4902(a). However, neither the prosecutor nor the district court asserted this defect as a
basis for dismissal below and, as such, the state does not pursue the issue on appeal.
2

ISSUES
Conley states the issues on appeal as:
a. Did the District Court abuse its descression in summarily dismissing
the petition for post-conviction relief?
b. Was the petitioner denied effective assistance of counsel for failing to
suppress overbroad and unlawful search warrants?
c. Did prosecutorial misconduct occur with governmental intrusion into
Attorney-Client Relationship?
d. Was Petitioner-Appelant denied ineffective assistance of counsel for
failing to conduct a meaningful pretrial investigation.
e. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s
Motion to Take Judicial Notice of the underlying Criminal Records?
f. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s
Motion for Appointment of Counsel on post-conviction relief, when
the petition set forth cognizable non-frivolous claims?
g. Should the District Court be compelled to prepare the transcripts of
3/11/2013 hearing and 12/20/2012 MORNING SESSION necessary
for the Appellant to prove his claims to the Appeals Court, that are part
of the official record and are not exhibits in Supreme Court Dockets
41400 and 41399, or present in any filings the Appellant possesses?
(Appellant’s brief, pp.1-2 (capitalization, spelling, punctuation, and bolding in original).)
The state rephrases the issues as follows:
1. Has Conley failed to establish that the district court erred by denying his request
for counsel and summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition?
2. Has Conley failed to establish any basis for reversal based on the denial of his
motion for judicial notice?
3. Has Conley failed to establish error in the denial of his requests for unnecessary
transcripts?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Conley Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred By Denying His Request
For Counsel And Summarily Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Conley’s motion for the appointment of counsel and

granted the state’s motion for summary dismissal, finding Conley’s post-conviction
claims were “wholly unsupported by facts,” procedurally barred, and/or disproved by the
underlying criminal record and, as such, failed “to raise a possibility of a valid claim.”
(R., pp.276-77, 286-93.) Contrary to Conley’s assertions on appeal, a review of the
record and of the applicable law supports the district court’s findings that the allegations
in the petition failed to raise even the possibility of a valid claim, much less present an
issue of material fact entitling Conley to an evidentiary hearing. 2

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within the

discretion of the district court. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108,
1111 (2004); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 683, 214 P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009). In

2

A post-conviction claim is properly dismissed if the petitioner fails to present evidence
sufficient to show a material issue of fact on which relief can be granted. Workman v.
State, 144 Idaho 518, 522-23, 164 P.3d 798, 802-03 (2007). Because this is a higher
burden than demonstrating the possibility of a valid claim necessitating the appointment
of counsel, Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24, 218 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2009), Melton v.
State, 148 Idaho 339, 345, 223 P.3d 281, 287 (Ct. App. 2009), the state will focus on the
“possibility of a valid claim” standard on the assumption that if Conley did not show
entitlement to counsel the dismissal of his claims is proper, but that if he did show
entitlement to counsel then dismissal without the opportunity of counsel to appear was
error.
4

reviewing the denial of a motion for appointment of counsel in post-conviction
proceedings, “[t]his Court will not set aside the trial court’s findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous. As to questions of law, this Court exercises free review.” Brown
v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001), ---quoted -in -------Charboneau, 140 Idaho
at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111.

C.

The District Court Correctly Denied Conley’s Request For Counsel And
Dismissed His Post-Conviction Petition Because The Allegations In The Petition
Did Not Raise The Possibility Of A Valid Claim
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is governed

by I.C. § 19-4904. Post-conviction counsel should be appointed if the petitioner qualifies
financially and “alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require
further investigation on the defendant’s behalf.” Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654,
152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. When a motion
for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of discretion standard as applied to
I.C. § 19-4904 “permits the trial court to determine whether the facts alleged are such that
they justify the appointment of counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every
inference must run in the petitioner’s favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that
time and cannot be expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts.”
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13.
If, on the other hand, the claims in the petition are so patently frivolous that there
appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with the
assistance of counsel and further investigation, the court may deny the request for counsel
and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing meritless post-conviction petitions.
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Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Hust v. State, 147
Idaho 682, 684, 214 P.3d 668, 670 (Ct. App. 2009).
In his pro se petition, Conley alleged the following three claims: (1) “Ineffective
Assistance of Trial Counsel: Failure to Suppress Overbroad And Unlawful Search
Warrants”; (2) “Prosecutorial Misconduct: Government Intrusion Into Attorney-Client
Relationship”; and (3) “Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel: Failure to Conduct
Meaningfull Pretrial Investigation.” (R., pp.20-21 (bolding omitted, spelling original).)
Contrary to Conley’s assertions on appeal, application of the correct legal standards to the
facts of this case supports the district court’s decisions to deny Conley’s motion for the
appointment of counsel and, ultimately, to grant the state’s motion for summary
dismissal, because Conley failed in his petition and supporting affidavits to allege facts to
show even the potential viability of any of his claims. See Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22,
24, 218 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted) (“Only if all of the claims alleged in
the petition are frivolous may the court deny a request for counsel.”).

1. Conley Failed In His Petition To Allege Facts Demonstrating The Potential
Viability Of Either Of His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims
Conley alleged his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not moving to
suppress “two search warrants” on the basis that the “search warrants applications were
overbroad.” (R., p.20 (“CLAIM ONE” of the petition).) He also alleged trial counsel
was “constitutionally ineffective for failing to make an adequate investigation into the
two cases and explaination of trial strategy and coerced petitioners guilty pleas in order to
conceal his unpreparedness for a trial.” (R., p.21 (verbatim) (“CLAIM THREE” of the
petition).)

The district court denied Conley’s request for counsel and summarily
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dismissed these claims, finding the claims were “wholly unsupported by facts” and that
“nothing [in Conley’s affidavit] substantiates the assertions of ineffective assistance of
counsel.” (R., pp.276-77, 291.) Specifically, the court reasoned:
Conley renders his opinion as to why the search warrants were overbroad,
why the preliminary hearing should have gone differently, and numerous
ways in which his attorney could have done a better job prior to
sentencing, however, he does not present any objective evidence to
support these conclusions. As previously stated, there is a strong
presumption that counsel’s performance is adequate and meets reasonable
standards of competence, unless Petitioner can show otherwise. Looking
back and offering “but what if’s” does not overcome that presumption.
(R., p.291 (emphasis original).) Review of the record in light of the applicable law
supports the district court’s finding that Conley failed to allege facts to establish even the
potential viability of either of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774
P.2d 299, 307 (1989). An attorney’s performance is not constitutionally deficient unless
it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption
that counsel’s conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho
401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To establish prejudice, the petitioner
must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,
761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241,
244 (Ct. App. 1999).
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In support of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to
suppress the “two search warrants” that were issued in his underlying criminal cases,
Conley alleged: (1) his first trial attorney “strongly advised” him that he should challenge
both search warrants and the applications on which they were based because, “in [trial
counsel’s] opinion, the warrant was no good” (R., pp.36-37, ¶6); (2) in his first meeting
with his second trial attorney, Conley told trial counsel that he “wanted to have him
challenge the search warrants and have them suppressed and asked him to schedule a
hearing for that purpose” and that he “repeatedly insisted that [counsel] challenge and
move to suppress the search warrants based upon the fact that they were ove[r]broad and
violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution” (R., p.37, ¶8); (3) trial
counsel failed to adequately interview witnesses, prepare a witness list or call witnesses at
the preliminary hearing and, thus, “failed to establish a foundation of testimony that could
have been utilized in the suppression proceedings to establish” the search warrant
applications did not conform to the requirements of Ninth Circuit law (R., pp.38-39, ¶¶914); and (4) “[d]ue to counsel not making himself aware of” the Ninth Circuit case, “he
was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the search of [Conley’s] computer and
computer storage devices” (R., p.39, ¶14).

Conley also attached to his affidavit

incomplete copies of the search warrant applications and search warrants at issue. (R.,
pp.58-73.)

Contrary to Conley’s assertions, however, none of these allegations or

evidence raised even the possibility of a valid claim that counsel was ineffective for not
filing a motion to suppress.
Where the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is “counsel’s failure
to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by
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the trial court, is generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test.” State v.
Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 562, 199 P.3d 123, 137 (2008) (internal quotes and brackets
omitted). However, even where the petitioner demonstrates that “the motion, had it been
filed, should have been granted, the petitioner is still required to overcome the
presumption that the decision not to file the motion ‘was within the wide range of
permissible discretion and trial strategy.’” Wurdemann v. State, 161 Idaho 713, 718, 390
P.3d 439, 444 (2017) (quoting Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 561, 149 P.3d 833, 836
(2006)). Thus, to establish entitlement to counsel on his claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for not moving to suppress the “search warrants,” Conley was required to
allege facts showing both the possibility that such motion, if filed, would have been
granted and the possibility that counsel’s failure to file the motion was not a strategic
decision. Conley failed to meet this burden.
Conley’s bare assertions that the search warrant applications were “overbroad”
under Ninth Circuit precedent and that the evidence seized pursuant to the search
warrants were therefore inadmissible were not sufficient to entitle him to counsel.
Conley did not even attempt to explain why the search warrant applications were
overbroad, much less make any effort to demonstrate why a motion to suppress, had one
been made, would have been granted. He also failed to allege any facts to demonstrate
why trial counsel’s decision to not file a motion to suppress was anything other than
sound trial strategy. Even after being put on notice by the state’s motions that his claims
were bare and conclusory (see R., pp.180-81, 185-97), Conley failed to allege any
additional facts from which the district court could conclude that Conley’s belief that a
suppression motion should have been filed could be developed into a viable claim of
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ineffective assistance of counsel (see R., pp.209-16, 229-72). Having failed to do so,
Conley failed to show even the possibility of a valid claim entitling him to the
appointment of counsel.
The allegations in Conley’s petition and supporting affidavits also failed to raise
the possibility of a valid claim in relation to Conley’s claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for “failing to make an adequate investigation” and allegedly coercing
Conley’s guilty pleas “in order to conceal his unpreparedness for a trial.” (R., p.21.) As
found by the district court, Conley’s “lengthy affidavit” set forth numerous examples of
how, in Conley’s “opinion,” his trial counsel “could have done a better job prior to
sentencing,” but he failed to support those opinions with any “objective evidence” to
overcome the presumption that trial counsel’s performance was reasonable. (R., p.291;
compare R., pp.35-56.) Perhaps more importantly, and as argued by the state in its
motion for summary dismissal, Conley’s complaints about trial counsel’s performance
and his assertions that counsel coerced him into pleading guilty are affirmatively
disproved by the underlying criminal record.
Before he pled guilty, Conley filled out a “Guilty Plea Questionnaire” wherein he
specifically indicated he “had sufficient time to discuss the case with [his] attorney”; he
“told [his] attorney everything [he] kn[ew] about the crime, including any witness [he]
kn[ew] that would show [his] innocence”; he “fully discussed [most of] the facts and
circumstances sourround[ing] the case with [his] attorney”; his attorney discussed with
him the nature and elements of the charges” and “any possible defenses [he] may have to
the charges”; he was “fully satisfied with the representation of [his] attorney”; and there
was “nothing that matter[ed]” that he “requested [his] attorney to do that [had] not been
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done, including filing any motions or other requests in this case.” (#41399/41400 R.,
p.399.) Conley made similar representations at the guilty plea hearing, advising the court
that the answers he gave in the Guilty Plea Questionnaire were “true and correct,” that he
had “been represented by an attorney at all stages of [the] proceedings,” and that he was
“satisfied with that representation.” (4/8/13 Tr., p.12, Ls.11-15.)
Conley’s answers to the questions asked of him on the guilty plea questionnaire,
coupled with his representations during the plea colloquy, directly contradict his postconviction claim that trial counsel failed to adequately investigate his case and coerced
his guilty plea. Although the district court was required to accept Conley’s unrebutted
allegations as true and to construe all inferences in his favor, Charboneau, 140 Idaho at
793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13, it was not required to accept as true Conley’s self-serving,
after-the-fact statements that counsel did not conduct the investigation Conley would
have liked and, as a result, his plea was involuntary. This is especially true since the
record of the underlying criminal case also shows Conley’s true motivation for pleading
guilty was to take advantage of the plea bargain whereby, in exchange for Conley’s pleas,
the state dismissed numerous other charges and a persistent violator enhancement. (See
4/8/13 Tr., p.2, L.20 – p.4, L.18.) See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (a
petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to a guilty plea “must
convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational
under the circumstances”). In short, Conley has failed to show that his factual claims that
merely contradict the underlying record create the possibility of a valid claim that could
be developed by appointment of counsel in the present case.
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Because Conley failed to allege facts to raise even the possible validity of either of
his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the district court did not err in dismissing
those claims without appointing counsel.

2. Conley Failed In His Petition To Allege Facts Demonstrating The Potential
Viability Of His Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim
In addition to alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, Conley’s petition alleged
a due process violation based upon prosecutorial misconduct. (R., pp.20-21 (“CLAIM
TWO” of the petition).) Specifically, the petition alleged:
Petitioner had an Attorney-Client Relationship with former
Counsel Jeff Cronin, who was then assigned to prosecute both of
petitioners criminal cases and utilized information which he had obtained
in privileged attorney-client communications to prosecute both criminal
cases at the sentencing hearing. As a result, this violated petitioners “right
to counsel” and “due process of law” ….
(R., pp.20-21 (verbatim, citations omitted).) The state objected to Conley’s request for
counsel and moved to dismiss this claim, asserting, inter alia, it could have been raised
on direct appeal and was therefore barred by I.C. § 19-4901(b). (R., pp.180-81, 193-95.)
The district court denied counsel and dismissed the claim on a similar basis, finding, inter
alia, the claim had been raised and decided in the underlying criminal case and that
Conley’s petition was “nothing more than another attempt to argue what has already been
decided.”

(R., pp.276-77. 291-92.)

Contrary to Conley’s assertions on appeal,

application of the law supports the district court’s decision to dismiss his prosecutorial
misconduct claim without appointing counsel.
“The scope of post-conviction relief is limited.” Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720,
725, 932 P.2d 348, 353 (1997).

The remedy available under the Uniform Post-
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Conviction Procedure Act “is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to
the proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction.” I.C. §
19-4901(b); accord Rodgers, 129 Idaho at 725, 932 P.2d at 353 (“An application for postconviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal.”). Thus, any “issue which could have
been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in postconviction proceedings” except upon a “substantial factual showing” by admissible
evidence “that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability
of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented
earlier.” I.C. § 19-4901(b).
By their nature, claims of prosecutorial misconduct occurring at trial are claims
known to a defendant both at the time of trial and on direct appeal. Accordingly, Idaho’s
appellate courts have consistently applied the procedural bar of I.C. § 19-4901(b) and
held that such claims, even if not raised in the trial court or on direct appeal, are not
cognizable in post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g., Rodgers, 129 Idaho at 725, 932
P.2d at 353; Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 702-03, 365 P.3d 1050, 1056-57 (Ct. App.
2015); Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 475, 224 P.3d 536, 542 (Ct. App. 2009).
In this case, Conley presented no evidence that he could not, with due diligence,
have presented his prosecutorial misconduct claim earlier. In fact, the district court
specifically found Conley had actually raised the claim in connection with his postsentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., pp.291-92.) Because Conley could
have raised his prosecutorial misconduct claim on direct appeal, but did not, the claim
was waived and presented no possibility of a legally viable claim for post-conviction
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relief. The district court’s orders denying counsel and summarily dismissing this claim
should therefore be affirmed.

II.
Conley Has Failed To Establish Any Basis For Reversal Based Upon The Denial Of His
Motion For Judicial Notice
In conjunction with his pro se post-conviction petition, Conley filed a motion
requesting that the district court take judicial notice of the records in the underlying
criminal proceedings. (R., pp.31-34.) The state filed a response indicating it had no
objection to the request for judicial notice, except to the extent that Conley was
requesting the preparation of transcripts at tax-payer expense. (R., pp.175-76.) On the
same day it entered its orders denying the appointment of counsel and granting the state’s
motion for summary dismissal, the district court entered an order denying Conley’s
motion for judicial notice. (R., pp.283-85.) In doing so, the district court explained:
The Court … did not rely on the underlying criminal record in its decision
regarding Conley’s post-conviction relief petition, rather utilizing all files,
briefing, and material submitted in the civil file, and thus finds it
unnecessary to take notice of such. That being said, any document
specifically referenced by either party will be made part of the official
record.
(R., pp.283-84.)
Conley now challenges the district court’s order denying his request for judicial
notice, contending that a review of the court’s summary dismissal order shows it actually
reviewed and relied on the underlying record, and that its failure to grant the motion for
judicial notice shows “the dismissal itself was likely in error.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.3637.) Conley’s argument fails. While the state agrees it appears from the court’s order of
summary dismissal that it reviewed and relied on the entire record of the underlying
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criminal case (see R., pp.286-87, 290-92), Conley has failed to show that the court’s act
of doing so, without formally taking judicial notice of all of the documents upon which it
was relying, actually prejudiced Conley’s substantial rights. See I.R.C.P. 61 (“The court
at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding
which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”).
Idaho Rule of Evidence 201(d) states that, when requested by a party, a district
court “shall take judicial notice” of specifically identified “records, exhibits or transcripts
from the court file in the same or a separate case.” Although the district court in this case
purported to deny Conley’s request for judicial notice of the records in his underlying
criminal case, it is clear that the court actually reviewed those records when ruling on
Conley’s request for counsel and the state’s motion for summary dismissal. (See R.,
pp.286-87, 290-92.) It is equally clear that the conclusions drawn by the district court
from its review of those underlying criminal records are capable of appellate review
because the Idaho Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of those records in conjunction
with this appeal. (See 12/5/16 Order Reinstating Appeal (“tak[ing] judicial notice of the
Clerk’s Record and Reporter’s Transcripts filed in related appeal Nos. 41399 and
41400”).) Because this Court may review the underlying criminal records and compare
them to the district court’s findings, and because, as explained in the preceding section,
those records actually support the district court’s conclusions that none of Conley’s postconviction claims are potentially viable, Conley cannot demonstrate any actual prejudice
arising from the failure of the district court to have formally taken judicial notice before
denying his request for counsel and granting the state’s motion to dismiss. Any error
was, at worst, harmless. See I.R.C.P. 61.
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III.
Conley Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Requests For Unnecessary
Transcripts
Both before and after the appellate record was settled, Conley filed several
objections and/or motions to augment the record with a number of items, including an asyet prepared transcript of the morning session of his December 20, 2012 preliminary
hearing. (See, e.g., 1/30/17 Appellant’s Objection To Reporter’s Transcript And Clerk’s
Record; 4/24/17 Appellant’s Request To Suspend Briefing Schedule Pending Appellant’s
Objection To Reporter’s Transcript And Clerk’s Record; 5/25/17 Motion To Reconsider
May 3, 2017 Order; 6/22/17 Appellant’s Second Objection To Reporter’s Transcript.)
The Idaho Supreme Court denied Conley’s motions to the extent they requested the
preparation of transcripts, but entered orders ensuring Conley access to transcripts that
already exist as part of the underlying criminal record.

(5/3/17 Order; 6/5/17 Order

Granting Motion; 6/28/17 Order Denying Second Objection.)
Conley now challenges the denial of his request for preparation of the December
20, 2012 transcript, arguing the transcript was “necessary to prove” the prosecutorial
misconduct allegations alleged in Claim Two of his post-conviction petition. (R., pp.1315.) Conley’s claim of entitlement to the transcript fails for two reasons. First, the
transcript was never prepared for or considered by the district court and, as such, cannot
be considered by this Court on appeal. See, e.g., Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714,
170 P.3d 375, 379 (2007) (appellate court does not consider evidence that was neither
presented to nor considered by the trial court).

Second, the requested transcript is

unnecessary for resolution of any issue on appeal because, for the reasons set forth in
Section I.C.2., supra, Conley’s prosecutorial misconduct claim does not allege a
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cognizable claim for post-conviction relief. See, e.g., Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S.
487, 495 (1963) (state “will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily” to provide
transcripts that “will not be germane to consideration of the appeal”). Because he is not
entitled to an unnecessary transcript, Conley has failed to show error.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the district
court’s orders denying the appointment of counsel and summarily dismissing Conley’s
petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 8th day of January, 2018.

/s/ Lori A. Fleming________________
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